Volume 3, Issue 2, December 2019, Page: 14-22
Intellectual Property and Standardisation: Key Aspects for an Innovative India
Begoña Glez Otero, EU Business School Group, Munich, Germany
Sheetal Chopra, Ericsson, Gurgaon, India
Received: Jul. 5, 2019;       Accepted: Oct. 16, 2019;       Published: Nov. 17, 2019
DOI: 10.11648/j.stpp.20190302.12      View  332      Downloads  113
The telecom sector has been a pivotal force behind India’s digital transformation. Surge in data consumption and rapid adoption of new technologies continue to redefine connectivity and engagement dynamics in India. As the largest data consumer and the second largest smartphone market, India is carving out a new digital identity globally. At the same time such a digital transformation has been brought by innovative companies who wish to be compensated for their efforts, often via licensing. The first part of this paper will explain the impact of standardization on the Indian market. The second part will focus on the key role of an effective patent enforcement system in balancing standardisation contributors and implementers’ interests. On this regard, the paper analyses the changing patent landscape in India. It follows a brief review of the Indian jurisprudence relating to patents essential to a technical standard. Third, the paper will identify some of the main strengths and obstacles of the patent litigation system in this particular field, including some concrete proposals or suggestions for improvement in the latter. Finally, the paper will sketch some general conclusions.
Standards, Standard Essential Patent, Patent Litigation, FRAND Licensing
To cite this article
Begoña Glez Otero, Sheetal Chopra, Intellectual Property and Standardisation: Key Aspects for an Innovative India, Science, Technology & Public Policy. Vol. 3, No. 2, 2019, pp. 14-22. doi: 10.11648/j.stpp.20190302.12
Copyright © 2019 Authors retain the copyright of this article.
This article is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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RAND is also used as synonymous of FRAND in the US.
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Six cases took place over the period of 2013 to 2016: Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (Publ) vs. Mercury Electronics and Anr. (2013) Delhi High Court, CS (OS) 442/2013; Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (PUBL) vs. GIONEE COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT CO. LTD. and ANR (2013), CS (OS) No. 2010/2013; Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson vs. Intex Technologies (India), Indiankanoon.org (2014) Delhi High Court, CS (OS) 1045/2014; Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (Publ) vs. Xiaomi Technology and Ors (2014) Delhi High Court, CS (OS) 3775/2014; Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (PUBL) vs. Lava International Ltd. (2015) Delhi High Court, CS (OS) 764/2015; Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (PUBL) vs. M/S BEST IT WORLD (INDIA) PRIVATE LIMITED (iBall) (2015), CS (OS) 2501/2015; Lava International Limited vs Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (PUB) (2016), CM (APPL.) 23769/2016.
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See above: Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson vs. Intex Technologies (India), Indiankanoon.org (2014) Delhi High Court, CS (OS) 1045/2014. The Court has used this tool during the appeal proceedings. Also, more recently in the Micromax vs, Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (2019) pronounced on April 23, Delhi High Court.
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For a detailed analysis of the case and the guidelines see: C. Tapia, S. Makris, “Negotiating Licenses for FRAND-accessible Standard Essential Patents in Europe after Huawei v. ZTE: Guidance from National Courts”, Managing IP, May 4, 2018. A very up-to-date database including summaries rendered after the Huawei v. ZTE case in key European countries, together with a national courts guidance on licensing negotiation for SEPs can be found at: https://caselaw.4ipcouncil.com/; last accessed May 23, 2019.
Section 108 (1): The reliefs which a court may grant in any suit for infringement include an injunction (subject to such terms, if any, as the court thinks fit) and, at the option of the plaintiff, either damages or an account of profits.
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In particular, the injunctions sought against Micromax, Intex, Xiaomi and Lava.
In the context of patent licensing, to hold-up refers to a situation where a patent holder seeks increased licensing fees because the patent is essential to a standard. For further information on hold-up see, among others: A. Galetovic, S. Haber, R. Levine, “An Empirical Examination of Patent Holdup” (2015) Journal of Competition Law and Economics, OUP, vol. 11 (3), 549-578.
In the context of patent licensing, to reverse hold-up or hold-out refers to a situation where a patent holder instead of being over-compensated, is in fact under-compensated by being forced to accept royalties that are lower than the value of the contribution of their technologies to a standard. For a detailed study of this and other situations arising in standard patent licensing see: V. Angwenyi, “Hold-up, Hold-out and F/RAND: The quest for balance” (2017) JIPLP vol. 12, issue 12, 1012-1023.
There could be several factors behind the transfer of judges reflected in the “Memorandum Showing The Procedure For Appointment And Transfer Of Chief Justices And Judges Of High Courts”, mainly to avoid any kind of potential unfair treatment. For instance, a transfer to another High Court occurs when a judge is appointed as Chief Justice. Also, when a lawyer from the bar is appointed as judge or when a judge is promoted to a High Court. In the event of a complain of corruption which does not lead automatically to impeachment, the judge accused is also transferred to another High Court.
See for instance: https://thediplomat.com/2016/04/30-million-pending-cases-fixing-indias-overburdened-judiciary/; and: https://www.businesstoday.in/current/economy-politics/3-3-crore-cases-pending-indian-courts-pendency-figure-highest-cji-dipak-misra/story/279664.html (last accessed May 23, 2019).
For a brief overview of case management conference see “Case Management Conference Law and Legal Definition”, available at: https://definitions.uslegal.com/c/case-management-conference/ (last accessed May 23, 2019). Also: https://sasklawcourts.ca/images/documents/Provincial_Court/Small_Claims/SC_Case_Management_Conference_Info.pdf (last accessed May 23, 2019).
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Estimating the future 5G patent landscape, October 2018, available at: https://www.ericsson.com/en/patents/estimating-the-future-5g-patentlandscape; last accessed May 23, 2019.
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